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POWER OF POSSESSOR OF PERSONAL PROPERTY TO
CREATE LIEN FOR REPAIRS AND STORAGE
CHARGES SUPERIOR TO EXISTING
INTERESTS OF OTHERS
ROBERT E. LEE t
A repairman or warehouseman has a common-law lien on the
property in his possession for repair and storage charges. A contro-
versial question, which frequently arises, is: Do the liens. of repairmen
or warehousemen take precedence over the claims of prior chattel mort-
gagees, conditional sellers, or bailors of the property in question? For
example, a person in possession of an automobile under a conditional
sales contract authorizes a garageman to do repair work on the car.
If the conditional buyer fails to maintain his payments under the coft-
ditional sales contract, may the conditional seller recover the possession
from the unpaid garageman who has rendered services on the car?
The war has greatly increased the importance of the question, since
it will probably be years before new automobiles can again be purchased
on the market. The existing cars will in the meantime be continually
in need of repairs. .The automobile finance companies have already
turned from the financing of automobile sales to the financing of re-
pairs on automobiles.
Conditional Sales and Chattel Mortgages
The decisions of the various jurisdictions have differed widely on
the question of priority as between the lien of an artisan for repairs
and the lien or title of a conditional seller or chattel mortgagee previ-
ously secured.1 Both views are represented by respectable authority;
each is supported by a variety of reasons. There probably cannot be
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I. For a discussion of this problem, see 5 BERRY, AUTOMOBILES (7th ed. 1935)
§ 5.479 et seq.; BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) § 112; (1927) 42 C. J., Motor Ve-
hices, § 453; HUDDY, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW (9th ed. 1932) § 68; RESTATE-
MENT, SECURITY (1941) §§ 75-76; I SELIGMAN, ECoNOMICs OF INSTALLMENT SELLING
(1927) 64; Whiteside, Priorities Between. Chattel Mortgagee or Conditional Seller and
Subsequent Lienors (1925) IO CORN. L. Q 331; Note, Power of a Possessor of a Chat-
tel to Impose a Lien Superior to Existing Interests (1927) 4o HARv. L. REV. 762;
Note, Artisan's Liens Competing .with Claims of Conditional Sale Vendor or Chattel
Mortgagee (1923) 22 MICH. L. REv. 46; Note, Extent to Which Comnww-Law Arti-
san's Lien Has Been Supplanted by Statute (1938) 37 MICEr. L. REV. 273; (1922) 20
A. L. R. 49; (1924) 30 A. L. R. 1227; (1928) 42 HARv. L. REV. 132; (1922) 5 MINN.
L. REV. 233; (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 753; (1934) 12 TENN. L. REv. 221; (1923)
32 YALE L. J. 623; (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 377.
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said to exist any general rule. The diversity may be largely attributed
to the fact that many of the decisions have taken into consideration
statutory provisions relating to artisans' liens. As is to be expected,
the greater number of the cases have dealt with automobiles.
The cases subordinating the liens of artisans to the claims of prior
chattel mortgagees and conditional sellers of the goods are usually based
upon one or more of the following reasons:
I i. Priority of liens is generally determined according to the time
they attach to the property.
2. Property of a person is not generally taken without his con-
sent to satisfy the debt of another.
3- One should not be compelled to pay for improvement to his
property neither expressly nor impliedly contracted for or assented to.
4. If a conditional sale or chattel mortgage is recorded, the artisan
can ascertain in advance the existence of an antecedent interest.
5. A priority granted to artisans will seriously impair financing
by conditional sales or chattel mortgages and render these security in-
struments unsafe forms of doing business.
6. Specific provision in the conditional sale or chattel mortgage,
restraining party in possession from authorizing repairs, is a controlling
factor.
7. Express statutory provision, subordinating liens of artisans to
claims of prior chattel mortgagees or conditional sellers, is a controlling
factor.
The cases subordinating the claims of conditional sellers and chat-
tel mortgagees to subsequent liens of artisans are usually based upon
one or more of the following reasons:
i. The conditional sale or chattel mortgage expressly or impliedly
authorized the person in possession to make necessary repairs.
2. The chattel was in the nature of an income-producing article
and without repairs it would have been impossible to use it so as to
pay the obligation owed the conditional seller or chattel mortgagee.
3. The repairs increased the value of the chattel and this inured to
the benefit of the conditional seller or chattel mortgagee as well as the
person in possession.
4. Specific provision in a conditional sale or chattel mortgage,
requiring person in possession to keep chattel repaired, is a controlling
factor.
5. Express statutory provision, subordinating the interests of
prior chattel mortgagees and conditional sellers to liens of artisans, is
a controlling factor.
912 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
In the absence of an express statute subordinating the interest of
the conditional seller or chattel mortgagee to the claims of a repairman,
overwhelmingly the greater number of the cases that have favored
the superiority of the repairman have based their decisions on an im-
plied consent on the part of the encumbrancer.
Courts have, at times, seized upon the slightest circumstance as a
basis for the implication of consent. In a few states a mortgagee or
conditional seller by allowing the mortgagor or conditional buyer to
have possession of a chattel for use is regarded as having impliedly
consented to a contract for reasonable repairs.2  In Meyers v. Neely
and Ensor Auto Co.,3 a Maryland case, though the. conditional sale was
recorded, yet because the conditional buyer was permitted to have
exclusive possession and use of the automobile, the conditional seller
was deemed to have impliedly authorized the conditional buyer to pro-
ceed to create a lien for necessary repairs. The court reasoned that
the need for repairs was an inevitable incident of the use for which the
automobile was purchased. And again, in Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car
Co. of America,4 an Indiana case, an automobile was sold to a pur-
chaser under a duly recorded chattel mortgage. Without consent or
knowledge of the mortgagee, the mortgagor placed the automobile in
the hands of a garageman for repairs. The repair bill was $936.62.
The balance due to the mortgagee on the car at the time was $523.
Holding that the rights of the repairman were paramount to those of
the mortgagee, the court said that the authority of the mortgagor to
act on behalf of the mortgagee was implied from the circumstances.
The ourt reasoned that the mortgagee must have contemplated that
the car would be used and that necessary repairs would be required,
and that this constituted the mortgagor the agent of the mortgagee for
the purpose of creating a lien for repairs. There was in the recorded
chattel mortgage contract an express provision to the effect that the
mortgagor was to pay the expense of repairs. But the court said:
"When the mortgagor, acting for himself and as the agent of the
mortgagee, delivers the mortgaged property and authorizes the making
of repairs or the furnishing of materials and supplies therefor, a con-
tract arises between the mortgagor and the mortgagee on the one hand,
and the mechanic or artisan or the other, and the law creates a lien in
2. New Britain Real Estate and Title Co. v. Collington, 1O2 Conn. 652, 129 Atl.
780 (1925) ; Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car Co. of America, 2o6 Ind. 296, 187 N. E. 382
(1933) ; Meyers v. Neeley & Ensor Auto Co., 143 Md. 107, 121 Atl. 916 (x923) ; Steb-
bins v. Balfour, 157 Minn. 135, 195 N. W. 773 (1923) ; Johnson v. Yates, 183 N. C. 24,
i1O S. E. 6o3 (1922) (chattel mortgage construing statute affirming C. L. Doctrine
Gen. Motor Co. v. Securities Inv. Co., 16 Tenn. App. 6o8, 65 S. W. (2d) 590 (1933;
Guaranty Securities Corp. v. Brophy, 243 Mass. 597, 147 N. E. 751 (1923); Wingote
v. Miss. Securities Co., 152 Miss. 852, 120 So. 175 (1929).
3. 143 Md. 107, 121 Atl. 916 (1923).
4. 2o6 Ind. 296, 187 N. E. 382 (1933).
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favor of the latter which will bind the property, notwithstanding an
additional agreement between the mortgagor and the mortgagee that
the mortgagee shall pay for the repairs, or even an agreement that no
liens shall be incurred, since the law creates the lien and not the con-
sent of the parties."
In the above cases it does not appear that the automobiles were
to be used for the purpose of earning money with which to pay the
purchase-price. This circumstance has influenced some of the deci-
sions.5 In the leading English case of Williams v. Allsup,6 wherein a
shipwright's lien for repairs to a vessel was held superior to the inter-
ests of a mortgagee, Erie, C. J., said: "I put my decision on the ground
suggested by Mr. Millish, viz., that the mortgagee having allowed the
mortgagor to continue in the apparent ownership of the vessel, making
it a source of profit and a means of earning the wherewithal to pay
off the mortgage debt, the relation so created by implication entitles the
mortgagor to do all that may be necessary to keep her in an efficient
state for that purpose. The case states that the vessel had been con-
demned as unseaworthy by the government surveyor, and so was in a
condition to be utterly unable to earn freight or be an available security
or any source of profit at all." 7 In Metropolitan Securities Co. v.
Orlow,8 Marshall, C. J., of the Ohio Supreme Court, concedes the
paramount claims of a mechanic when asserted against a chattel such
as a locomotive in public use, but denies the same claim when asserted
against a pleasure car. The distinction is made on the ground that a
pleasure car not only earns nothing, but offers greater security to the
mortgagee by remaining idle. The doctrine announced in Williams v.
Allsup, it is submitted, is difficult of application to.the facts of a par-
ticular case. It should be limited to admiralty cases. When is a chattel
purchased under a title-retaining instrument to be deemed an income-
producing article? Would it be profitable to repair and put in running
condition certain types of income-producing machines? Would not the
costs of repairs offset any profits that might be derived from a con-
tinued use of the chattels? And also, may not a chattel be used for
both pleasure and business?
In Goldstein v. Mack Motor Truck Co.,9 a Rhode Island case, A
gave B in Massachusetts a truck under a conditional sales contract.
There was a provision in the contract to the effect that B was to keep
5. Watts v. Sweeney, 127 Ind. ii6, 26 N. E. 68o (i89o) (mortgaged railway loco-
motive) ; Hammond v. Danielson, 126 Mass. 294 (1879) (mortgaged hack driven for
hire); Garr v. Clements, 4 N. D. 559, 62 N. W. 64o (i895) (mortgaged threshing
machine).
6. io C. B. N. S. 417 (Eng. i861).
7. Id. at 426.
8. 107 Ohio St. 583, 14 N. E. 306 (1923).
9. 56 R. I. 1, 183 Atl. 136 (1936).
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the truck in repair at his own expense. B defaulted in monthly pay-
ments. A found the truck in the possession of C, a repairman, in
Rhode Island, a state where conditional sales are not required to be
filed. B had authorized the repairs.. In an action of replevin, the
Rhode Island court held that A was entitled to possession of the truck
and nominal damages. A similar set of facts and decision were present
in an Illinois case 10 dealing with a truck sold under a chattel mortgage
contract.
In both the Rhode Island and the Illinois case the chattel was a
truck, and it was doubtless the understanding of the parties that the
truck would be profitably employed, so as to produce an income with
which to pay the purchase-price. The courts might have very well
invoked the doctrine of Williams v. Allsup. Trucks are income pro-
ducing chattels. It is true that the title-retaining instruments ex-
pressly denied to the party in possession any authority to subject the
chattel to a lien, but could not the decision have been grounded upon
an apparent authority? Secret limitations of authority do not affect
the rights of innocent third persons who rely upon an apparent author-
ity.1' It is far more logical to imply an authority to create repair liens
on trucks than on passenger cars.
It is generally held, however, that a chattel mortgage or condi-
tional sales contract containing an express provision requiring the per-
son in possession to keep the chattel in repair, at his own expense, is
sufficient to protect the chattel mortgagee or conditional seller against
the liens of repairmen.' 2 If the provision merely states that the mort-
gagor or conditional buyer is to keep the chattel in repairs, and is silent
on the question of who is to bear the expense of the repairs, there is
some uncertainty as to the reshlt that will be reached. It is probable that
the court will grasp this as a circumstance implying an authority on
the part of the mortgagor or conditional buyer to authorize a lien for
repairs on the credit of the automobile.'3 On the other hand, it may
io. Ehrlich v. Chapple, 311 Ill. 467, 143 N. E. 61 (1924).
II. In Albemarle Supply Co. v. Hend & Co., I K. B. 307 (1928), A delivered to
B taxicabs under a hire-purchase agreement, which expressly stipulated that B was to
keep them in repair and not to subject them to any liens. B delivered the cabs to C to
be repaired. C knew at the time that B held the cabs under a hire-purchase agreement,
but was ignorant of the terms. B defaulted in his payments to A while the the cabs
were in the possession of C. A terminated his agreement with B and demanded the
cabs from C. C claimed a common-law lien for repairs and refused to surrender cabs.
A brought an action of detinue. The court held that C had a valid lien against the prop-
erty.12. Ehrlich v.. Chapple, 311 Ill. 467, 143 N. E. 6i (1924), ii VA. L. REv. 67;
Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Orlow, 107 Ohio St. 583, 14o N. E. 306 (1923);
Goldstein v. Mack Truck Co., 56 R. I. I, 183 Atl. 136 (1936) ; Overland Auto Co. v.
Findley, 234 S. W. io6 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). Contra: Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car Co.
of America, 206 Ind. 296, 187 N. E. 382 (1933).
13. See RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (1941) § 76, comment. In Atlas Securities Co.
v. Grove, 79 Ind. App. 144, 137 N. E. 570 (i922), the conditional sale contract required
the conditional buyer "to make all repairs necessary to keep the property in first-class
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be very well argued that such an express stipulation implies quite defi-
nitely that the expense of repairs is to be paid by the chattel mortgagor
or conditional buyer, and that this is more in keeping with general
custom.
A considerable number of cases have rejected the implied consent
theory and emphatically declared that a lien cannot attach to property
without "due authority" of the owner.-4 In speaking of the implied
consent theory, a Rhode Island court 15 said, "The implication of
authority and consent will not arise solely from the fact that a mort-
gagor or vendee is permitted to retain possession and to use a chattel
which in the course of its use will probably need repairs." Williston
says that a conditional "seller's title prevails over an asserted lien of
one who makes repairs on the order of the conditional buyer." 16
A similar rule exists generally in respect to mechanics' liens for
repairs or improvements to real property. As a general rule, where
real property is subject to an existing mortgage or other encumbrance,
such mortgage or encumbrance retains its priority and the mechanic's
lien is postponed thereto, notwithstanding the value of the security is
increased by the labor and materials of the mechanic's lien claimant. 17
The mortgagor may, of course, create a mechanic's lien affecting his
own interest. A purchase-money mortgage on real property has many
of the characteristics of a chattel mortgage and a conditional sale.
In a few cases the court has denied the lien of the repairman on
personalty even though the repairs where made with the knowledge of
the owner.' 8 In Arnold v. Chandler,'9 the plaintiff delivered to Ruzzo
condition." The court said (Id. at 151, 137 N. E. at 573): "The mere fact that the
automobile in the instant case needed repairs in order that the vendee might continue
to use it is not sufficient to give appellee (repairman) a priority over title of appellant
(conditional seller). The intent of the vendors, however, to permit and authorize
necessary repairs to be made by the conditional vendor appears in the contract itself."
14. Ellis Motor Co. v. Hibbler, 219 Ala. 53, 121 So. 47 (1929) ; Hawkes v. First
Nat'l Bank of Telluride, 75 Colo. 47, 224 Pac. 224 (1924); Baughman Auto Co. v.
Emanuel, 137 Ga. 354, 73 S. E. Si (1912); Ehrlich v. Chapple, 311 Ill. 467, 143 N. E.
6I (1924); Storms v. Smith, i37 Mass. 201 (1884); Bath Motor Mart v. Miller, i
Me. 29, 118 At. 7,5 (1920) ; Denison v. Shuler, 47 Mich. 598, 1I N. W. 402 (1882);
Sargent v. Usher, 55 N. H. 287 (1875) (agister's lien subordinate to the lien of chattel
mortgagee) ; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sutherland, 122 Neb. 720, 241 N. W.
281 (I932); Cleveland Auto Top and Trimming Co. v. American Finance Co., 124
Ohio St. i69, 177 N. E. 217 (193i); Cache Auto Co. v. Central Garage, 63 Utah io,
221 Pac. 862 (1923); Arnold v. Chandler, 45 R. I. 469, 123 Atl. 85 (924) ; Revere
Copper & Brass, Inc., v. Craig, 52 R. I. io6, 157 Atl. 879 (1932) ; Scott v. Garage Co.,
88 W. Va. 92, 105 S. E. 425 (i92r) ; Adler v. Godfrey, 153 Wis. 186, 14o N. W. ii5
(1913) (garage keeper's lien for storage) ; see BROWN, PEsONAL. PROPERTY (1936)
§ 112; (1938) 8 C. J. S., Baihments, § 35h; 3 JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDI-
TIONAL SALEs (6th ed. 1933) § 1122; (I933) 12 TENN. L. RaV. 221.
15. Arnold v. Chandler, 45 R- I. 469, 472, 123 Atl. 85, 86 (i924).
16. 1 WLisToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 324.
17. 2 JONES, LiE:s (3d ed. 1914) §§ 1458-1459; 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)
§§ 588, 603; 36 Am. JuR., Mechanics' Li;s (ig4i) § 18i; (1926) 40 C. J., Mechanics'
Lienls, § 369.
i8. Baughman Auto Co. v. Emanuel, 137 Ga. 354, 73 S. E. 5II (1912) ; Arnold v.
Chandler, 45 R. I. 469, 123 Atl. 85 (i924).
19. 45 R. I. 469, 123 Atl. 85 (1924).
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an automobile under a bailment lease, designated by the Rhode Island
courts a conditional sale. Ruzzo placed the car in the hands of the
defendant for necessary repairs. When Ruzzo defaulted in his monthly
payments, the plaintiff demanded the automobile of the defendant.
Upon the defendant's refusal to give it up until his repair charges
were paid, plaintiff brought an action of replevin. Held, plaintiff was
entitled to possession of automobile, notwithstanding the fact that
Ruzzo was allowed to remain in possession of the car as conditional
buyer and plaintiff knew repairs were being made. The court rejected
the contention of defendant that the plaintiff by entrusting Ruzzo with
possession, with knowledge that it would be in need of repairs, gave
him an implied authority to create a lien against it. The court declared
that possession, under such circumstances, did not raise an implication
of authority.
The conduct of the conditional seller was not sufficient to have
estopped him from denying the authority of the conditional buyer to
order the repairs. A conditional seller may reasonably assume that re-
pairs are being made solely on the personal credit of the conditional
buyer and not upon the credit of the property itself.
It seems to make little difference with the courts that have lib-
erally and indiscriminately followed the implied consent doctrine
whether the chattel mortgage or conditional sales recording statutes
have been complied with. There have been several cases where the
conditional seller's interest in a recorded conditional sale has been sub-
ordinated to the claims of a repairman on the broad principle that pos-
session and use of a chattel alone imply an authority to create repair
liens.20 In the greater number of cases, however, a mortgagee or con-
ditional seller who has duly recorded the agreement will prevail over
a repairman who has made repairs at the request of a mortgagor or
conditional buyer. 2 ' The same result has been reached in states where
conditional sales are not required to be recorded.
22
The chattel mortgage and conditional sale recording statutes vary
materially as to the classes of persons they are intended to protect.
Some statutes protect all "third parties," while others protect only inno-
cent purchasers from, or judgment and attachment creditors of, the
person in possession. Section 5 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
reads: "Every provision in a conditional sale reserving property in the
2o. New Britain Real Estate and Title Co. v. Collington, 1O2 Conn. 
652, 129 Ati.
780 (1925) ; Meyers v. Neeley & Ensor Auto Co., 143 Md. 107, 121 Atl. 916 (1923).
21. Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Orlow, lO7 Ohio St. 583, 14o N. E. 3o6 (1923);
Ford v. Bates, i5o Ore. 672, 47 P. (2d) 951 (1935) ; 3 JoNES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES
AND CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed. 1933) § 1122; Whiteside, Priorities Between Chattel
Mortgagee or Conditional Seller and Subseqgunt Liemwrs (1925) IO CORN. L. Q. 331
[FRYER, READINGS ON PERSONAL PROPERTY (1938) 417].
22. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Lynn, 167 Miss. 93, 148 SO. 351 (1933) ; RESTATEmENT,
SECURITY (1941) § 76, comment.
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seller, shall be void as to any purchaser from or creditor of the buyer,
who, without notice of such provision, purchases the goods or acquires
by attachment or levy a lien upon them, before the contract or copy
thereof shall be filed as hereinafter provided, unless such contract or
copy is filed within ten days after making of the conditional sale."
Only innocent purchasers from and creditors of the conditional
buyer are entitled to attack the agreement if it has not been filed. The
Act uses the phrase "purchaser without notice," but this undoubtedly
is the equivalent of "bona fide purchaser" or "innocent purchaser."
The creditors are those who have acquired a lien on the property by
way of attachment or levy prior to the filing and without notice that
the buyer held the goods under a conditional sales contract. Since re-
pairmen are neither purchasers nor creditors who have acquired a lien
by attachment or levy, it would seem that in the states that have adopted
the Act a conditional sales contract does not have to be filed as far
as repairmen dealing with conditional buyers are concerned. The con-
ditional seller of an unfiled contract should be allowed, accordingly, to
take his property from the possession of a repairman. The conditional
sales transaction is not to be considered as fraudulent on account of
the deceptive appearance of ownership in the buyer. Section 4 of the
Act establishes the conditional sale transaction, as follows: "Every
provision in a conditional sale reserving property in the seller after
possession of the goods is delivered to the buyer, shall be valid as to
all persons, except as hereinafter otherwise provided."
It is questionable whether the chattel mortgage or conditional sale
recording statutes should in any way affect the rights of a repairman.
An owner who has authorized another to create a lien on his property
should be estopped from claiming the protection of any recording stat-
ute. A rule that requires a repairman to search the chattel mortgage
and conditional sale recording statutes prior to the doing of any
repairs would work a tremendous hardship upon repairmen. A repair-
man would have to either demand costs in advance (something that
cannot always be determined in advance) or at great inconvenience
to himself and the person in possession search the records for either
a chattel mortgage or conditional sale. The burden would be far
greater to a mechanic than to a purchaser from, or creditor of, the
party in possession. Sales and execution proceedings usually are not
required to be carried through with the speed of repairs; for example,
repairs to an automobile.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, adopted by nine states, 23 has
no provisions relating to liens of artisans and repairmen. The Uni-
23. Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Da-
kota, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 2 U. L. A. (SuPP. 1941) 6.
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form Chattel Mortgage Act, as yet not adopted by any of the states, 24
provides as follows: 25
"i. (a) Chattel liens given by any statute or rule of law.
against an owner of goods for services or materials necessary to
the protection or preservation of the goods, shall attach against the
interest of the mortgagee, although the instrument be duly filed
or the lienor have notice of the mortgage.
"i. (b) Chattel liens so given shall likewise attach against
the interest of the mortgagee, to the extent that such services or
materials result in direct enhancement of the value of the goods.
"'2. Such liens shall not so attach, however, beyond twenty-
five percent of the original amount secured by the mortgage.
"3. Failure by the mortgagor to dissolve any such lien within
ten days after notice of demand duly given by the mortgagee,
shall constitute default; and the mortgage may provide that sub-,
jection of the goods to any such lien shall constitute default.
"4. This section shall not of itself obligate the mortgagee
personally for the debt secured by any such lien; nor shall consent
of the mortgagee to the attachment of a more extended lien be
construed of itself to make the mortgagee so liable.
"5. Subsection I shall, with resipect to the lien of garagemen
on mortgaged automobiles, extend only to amounts not exceed-
ing fifty dollars."
The Restatenwnt of Security 26 reads:
"Subject to the provisions of recording statutes, where a
lien exists in consequence of the bailment of a mortgaged chattel
or a chattel held under a conditional sales contract, the interest of
the mortgagee or conditional vendor is prior to that of.any lienor
except a hotelkeeper, a landlord or a connecting carrier unless
words or circumstances justify the inference that the mortgagee
or conditional vendor has consented to subordinate his interest."
A comment on the above section says:
"Normally the priority of legal interests is determined by the
order of their creation. While subsequent legal interests some-
times prevail over prior interests because the holders of the prior
interests have created or permitted situations likely to deceive
holders of subsequent interests who acquire the subsequent inter-
ests in good faith and for value', the requirements of public
recordation in the case of conditional sales and chattel mortgages
almost universally assure that the holders of subsequent interests
can ascertain in advance the existence of the antecedent interests."
Lien statutes are more and more becoming the decisive factors in
contests for priority between repairmen and conditional sellers or chattel
24. FRYER, READINGS ON PERSONAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1938) 434.
25. Ibid. Found also in STuRGEs, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CaRErr TRANSACTioNS
(2d ed. 1936) i03i.
26. RESTATEMIENT, SECURITY (1941) § 76.
LIENS FOR REPAIRS AND STORAGE CHARGES
mortgagees.27 The common-law artisan's lien has been replaced by
statute in some particular in all but five states.28 The language of these
statutes is exceedingly varied in the several jurisdictions. Amendments
are frequent and the courts widely differ on their interpretations. Any-
thing other than a general reference to these statutory provisions, there-
fore, would do no more than complicate an already difficult subject by
adding a mass of unrelated detail.
In many states the statutes are merely declaratory of the common
law and do nothing more than provide an effective means of enforc-
ing the artisan's lien.29 But in some jurisdictions statutes contain
express provisions upon the question of priority as between repairmen
and other lien claimants. In several instances the statutes have specifi-
cally declared the artisan's lien superior to the liens of conditional sellers
or chattel mortgagees. 30 In New York,31 for example, the statute
provides that the artisan's lien may arise "at the request or with the
consent of the owner, whether such owner be a conditional vendee or
a mortgagor remaining in possession or otherwise." California, 2 New
Mexico,3" North Carolina,34 South Dakota3 5 and Wisconsin 3 6 allow
the lien when the repairs are rendered "at the request of the owner or
legal possessor." In Virginia 3 7 the "person legally in possession" may
create an artisan's lien superior to a prior conditional sale or chattel
27. 3 JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDrIONAL SALES (6th ed. 1933) § 1124;
Whiteside, Priorities Between Chattel Mortgagee or Conditional Seller and Subsequent
Lienors (1925) 1o CORN. L. Q. 331; Note, Extent to Which Common-Law Artisan's
Lien Has Beenv Supplanted by Statute (1938) 37 MicH. L. REv. 273.
28. Ibid.
29. At common law the only means available to an artisan for the enforcement of
his lien was a retention of the property until the repairs were paid. He had no right
to sell the subject matter of the lien. Statutory provisions for enforcing the liens vary,
but in most states the repairman after a specified time and notice to the owner may sell
the property at a public or private sale. Note, Extent to Which Commonw-Law Arti-
san's Liem. Has Been Supplanted by Statute (1938) 37 Mica. L. REv. 273, 274; (1938)
8 C. J. S., Bailnments, § 35e.
30. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) f§ 3051-3052; ME. REv. STAT. (1930) C. 105,
§ 56; MINN. STAT. ANN. (Mason, 1927) § 8528; NEw MEx. STAT. AxN. (Courtright,
1929) § 8-402; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (McKinney, Supp. 1939) c. 33, § 184; ORE. CODE
ANN. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1930) §§ 51-501, 51-504; S. D. CoMP. LAWS (1929) § 1700-A;
WIs. STAT. (1939) § 289.41; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) § 6443 (to extent of
$25); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Maskowitz, 142 Misc. 773, 255 N. Y. Supp. 525
(932), aff'd, 238 App. Div. 831, 262 N. Y. Supp. 973 (1933), reargument denied, 239
App. Div. 770, 263 N. Y. Supp. 936 (933) ; I JONES, LIENS (3d ed. 1914) §§ 731-786c;
RESTATEMENT, SECURTY (1941) § 76, comment; Note (1921) 6 MINN. L. REv. 233.
In New Jersey repairs on aircraft are superior to properly recorded prior condi-
tional sales and chattel mortgages, but repairs on motor vehicles are subordinate to
properly recorder prior conditional sales and chattel mortgages. N. J. REV. STAT.
(937) § 2:60-2 (aircraft) and §§ 2:60-21, 2:6o-22 (motor vehicles).
31. N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (McKinney, Supp. 1939) C. 33, § 184. Minnes6ta has a sim-
ilar provision. MINN. STAT. ANN. (Mason, 1927) § 8528.
32. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) §§ 3051-3052.
33. NEw Mnx. STAT. ANN. (1929) § 82-4o.
34. 14. C. CODE ANN. (Miehie, 1935) § 2435.
35. S. D. Comp. LAWS (1929) § 1700-A.
36. WIS. STAT. (1939) C. 143, §28941.
37. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) § 6443.
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mortgage to the extent of twenty-five dollars only. In Oregon 3 8 "at
the request of its owner, reputed owner, or authorized agent of the
owner, or lawful possessor thereof."
In Illinois,8 9 Iowa,40 Maryland, 41 New Jersey, 42 and Washing-
ton 43 statutes expressly subordinate the lien of the artisan to condi-
tional sales, chattel mortgages, and other prior liens of record. Prior
encumbrances not on record are, of course, inferior in these states to
the artisan's lien.
At common law the repairman has a lien only so long as he re-
tains possession of the property upon which the work has been done.44
The artisan's lien is lost by a voluntary surrender of possession. Stat-
utes, however, in a considerable number of states expressly provide
that the lien is not dependent upon a retention of possession by the
artisan.45 To be entitled to a lien after parting with possession, a
majority of these statutes require a filing of a notice of the lien, within
a specified time, usually thirty or sixty days, after which foreclosure
takes place as in the case of chattel mortgages. 46
In states where by statute or decision an artisan's lien has been
subordinated to existing liens of conditional sellers and chattel mort-
gagees, these statutes, providing for enforcement of an artisan's lien
38. ORE. CODE ANN. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1930) § 51-5O1.
39. ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 82, § 43 (statute mentions only recorded
chattel mortgages).
40. IOWA CODE (1939) c. 456, § 10343.
41. MD. CODE ANN. (Flack, 1939) art. 63, § 41.
42. In New Jersey a garage keeper's lien for repairs and storage is expressly sub-
ordinated to a properly recorded prior conditional sale or chattel mortgage; but one who
does repairs on, or furnishes storage for, an aircraft is granted a lien "that shall be
superior to all other liens, except liens of state, county or city for taxes, and the operator
of such aircraft shall be deemed the agent of any owner, mortgagee, conditional vendor
or other lienor thereof for the creation of such superior lien." There is no statute de-
termining the priority of those that furnish repairs and storage for .other kinds of per-
sonal property. N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) §§ 2:60-2I, 2:6o-22 (motor vehicles) and
§ 2:60-2 (aircraft).
43. WASH. Rxv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 1156.
44. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) § io8; (1938) 8 C. J. S., Balinents, § 35;
ScoTT, BAILMENTS (1931) iog; Rodgers v. Grothe, 58 Pa. 414 (1868).
45. ALA. CODE (1928) §§ 8863-8864; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §§ 882o-8827;
GA. CODE (I933) §§ 67-2003, 67-2401; FLA. COmP. LAws (1927) 8§ 5369, 5382, 5384;
ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 82, § 40; KAN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935)
§ 58-201; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, 1936) art. 5, § 2739h-I (p. 1447) ; MD. CODE ANN.
(Flack, 1939) art. 63, § 41 (lien on motor vehicles; valid against owner and third per-
sons without notice); ME. REv. STAT. (1930) C. 105, §§ 66-70; NEB. CoMi. STAT.
(1929) § 52-201 to 52-203; N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) § 2:6o-22 (motor vehicles) and
§ 2:6o-3 (aircraft); N. M. STAT. ANN. (1929) § 82-1lo et seq.; N. D. CotP. LAWS
(1913) 2§6877-6878; OKI.A. STAT. ('931) §§110O1-110o4; OR. CODE ANN. (I93O)
§ 51-501 to 51-5o6; S. D. Comp . LAWS (1929) §§ I7ooA-I7oE; WAsr. Rv. STAT.
ANN. (Remington, 1932) §§ 1154-1157; Note, Extent to Which Commonr-Law Artisan's
Lien Has Been Supplanted by Statute (1938) 37 MICIr. L. RE. 273, 275.
46. GA. CODE (1933) §§ 67-2003, 67-2401; ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935)
c. 82, § 45; KAN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) art. 58, § 201; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll,
1936) art. 5, § 27391 (p. 1447) ; NEa. Comp. STAT. (1929) §§ 52-201 to 52-203; N. D.
Comp'. LAWS (1913) §6877-6878; OKLA. STAT. (93) §§ 11001-11004; ORx. CODE
ANN. (1930) § 51-501 to 5I-5o6; S. D. Comsp. LAWS (1929) §§ 17oA-17OOE; WASHI.
REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 1154-1157.
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after parting with possession, present no particularly difficult problem.
On the other hand, if in states where these statutes exist there are
decisions or other statutes declaring an artisan's lien superior to liens
of conditional sellers and chattel mortgagees, the artisan who has parted
with possession has precedence over a prior encumbrancer who has
parted with possession. This is a clear violation of the general rule
that a lien takes precedence accordance to the time it attached to the
property. Both the repairman and the prior encumbrancer are lien
claimants who have voluntarily surrendered possession of a chattel.
Both may have satisfied statutes requiring a public record of their lien.
It would seem that the claim of the first encumbrancer should be pre-
ferred, in the absence of circumstances indicating that the conditional
seller or chattel mortgagee has consented to a subordination of his in-
terest. But the law is otherwise, of course, in those states where there
is a manifested legislative intent that the artisan's lien shall be superior
to the existing liens of conditional sellers and chattel mortgagees. The
statute, and not the contract of the party in possession, creates the lien.
The different types of statutory liens mentioned above are gen-
erally broad enough to include repairs on all kinds of personal prop-
erty; but there are a few that are limited explicitly to a designated
species of property. An increasing number of these statutes are appli-
cable only to motor vehicles.
At common law a garagekeeper is not accorded a lien for storage
charges. 47  This is due to the fact that the privilege of a lien is usually
extended only to those who have by their skill and labor imparted some
additional value to the property. The lien, however, has today been
:granted in many states by statute.48  In several of these states the lien
exists even though the garage keeper voluntarily surrenders posses-
sion.49
47. BROWT, PERSONAL. PROPERTY (1936) § io8; Note (1938) 37 Micr. L. REV.
273, 277; see (1916) 6 C. J. 1132, notes 97-98 and (938) 8 C. J. S. 292, note 72 for
cases.
48. ARIz. REV. CODE (1928) § 2042; CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 3051-7;
DEL. REv. CODE (935) §§ 3344-3350; IN]. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, '935) § 11,85; IOWA
CODE (939) §10345; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 2739h-I, 2; MASS. GEN. LAWS
(932) c. 255, §25; ME. Rv. STAT. (1930) C. 105, §56, 57; MO. REV. STAT. (1929)
§ 3218; NEv. COMp. LAWS (929) § 3772; N. H. PuB. LAWS (1926) C. 217, §§ 35, 36;
N. J. REv. STAT. (I937) §§2:6o-20 to 2:60-31; N. Y. CONS. LAws (I9o9) c. 38, § 184
(Birdseye, 1917, P. 4930); (Mc!inney, 1917, tit. 32) ; TEN . CODE (1932) § 7979; VA.
CODE (1936) § 6445; W. VA. CODE ANN. (1936) § 2936; Wis. STAT. (I939) § 28943.
In the following states artisans or bailees generally are given a lien for storage.
Accordingly, garage owners in these states possess liens for storage.
CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1937) §§ 3051, 3052; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§§ 8507-8509; MONT. REv. CODE (935) §§ 8383-8385; N. D. ComP. LAWS (913)
§§6877-6878; OKLA. STAT. (1931) § 10985; ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1937) c. 82,
§§40-45; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §§ 51-501 to 51-5o6.
49. Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, Maine, Missouri, and
Oregon.
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Pennylvania Bailment Leases
A bailment lease with an option to buy attached is valid in Penn-
Sylvania, though unrecorded, against all persons. 50 In this state the
artisan's lien is the same as at common law, except that a more effec-
tive means of enforcement has been provided by statute.51 There are
no statutory provisions in Pennsylvania relating to the question of
priority as between liens of an artisan and prior encumbrance. The
artisan loses his lien through a voluntary possession to the owner.
5 2
Garage keepers in Pennsylvania have been given no statutory lien for
storage charges.
In Pennsylvania, the courts have definitely subordinated the fa-
vored position of the repairman and warehouseman to that of the
bailor." The bailor is permitted, upon breach of the terms of the
bailment lease, to recover the property wherever it may be found, even
though it may be in the hands of an innocent person with bona fide
claims for repair or storage charges.
The doctrine as to trademan's or artisan's liens was succinctly
stated by the Supreme Court in Meyers and Bro. v. Bratespiece: r4
"'Whenever a workman or artisan by his labor or skill increases the
value of personal property placed in his possession to be improved he
has a a lien upon it for his proper charges until paid,' but, 'in order to
charge a chattel with this lien, the labor for which the lien is claimed
must have been done at the request of the owner or under circum-
stances from which his assent can be reasonably implied. It does not
extend to one not in privity with the owners."
In Stern v. Sica 55 an automobile was delivered under a bailment
lease contract which provided that the automobile should be returned
"in as good condition" as when delivered. The car was found, after
default in rental payments, in the possession of a repairman. The
Superior Court held that the repairman could not withhold possession
50. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hartman, 114 Pa. Super. 544, 174 AtL 795
(1934) ; Stern & Co. v. Paul, 96 Pa. Super. xIz (1928).
51. Act of May 7, 1925, P. L. 557, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 6, §§ II-14.
52. ScoTr, LAW OF BAILMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA (1931) 109.
53. Meyers & Bro. v. Bratespiece, 174 Pa. 119, 34 Atl. 551 ( 896) ; Leitch v.
Sanford Motor Truck Co., 279 Pa. i6o, 123 Ati. 658 (I924) ; Estey Co. v. Dick, 41 Pa.
Super. 61o (191o) ; Stern v. Sica, 66 Pa. Super. 84 (1917); Hecht v. Valkone Dye &
Finishing Works, 66 Pa. Super. 97 (1917); Bankers' Commercial Security Co. v.
Brennan and Levy, 75 Pa. Super. 1gg (192o); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. White, 3 D. &
C. 338 (Pa. 1923) ; Frazier v. Bell & Dunie, 39 Lanc. 529 (Pa. 1925) ; Edson & Co. v.
Rinker & Anderson, 2o Berks 81 (Pa. 1926) ; F. A. North & Co. v. Hall, 2o Del. 324
(Pa. 1928) ; Conrad v. Hoch, 44 York 132, 26 Luz. 3, 14 D. & C. 172 (Pa. 1929) ;
Commercial Banking Corp. v. Warner, 31 Lack. 68 (Pa. 1930) ; Commercial Credit Co.
v. Wilson, 12 Erie 129 (Pa. i93o) ; Equitable Automobile Finance Co. v. Manuel, 16 D.
& C. 812 (Pa. 1932); Equitable Credit Co. v. Lloyd's Garage, 21 D. & C. 270 (Pa.
1934) ; cf. Auto Security Co. v. Mickens, 8o Pa. Super. 462 (1923) ; 5 BERRY, AUTO-
MOBILES (7th ed. 1935) § 5.579 et seq.
54. 174 Pa. 119, 121, 34 Atl. 551 (1896).
55. 66 Pa. Super. 84 (1917).
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from the bailor until the repair charges were paid. "There is nothing
in the language of the lease, nor any inference from the language used,
which would support any authority in the bailee to impair the bailor's
title by handing the property to a repairman, who imposes a lien thereon.
The use of the car cannot be made the foundation for authority to
subject the property to a lien: there should be more definite evidence
of authority coming from the owner. It may arise by implication but
the facts from which the inference is to be drawn should be such as
to reasonably lead to but one conclusion. The legal relation of lessor
and lessee of personal property would take on an aspect not thought
of by the parties of the bailee could create a lien for repair charges
against the property, of which the owner would have no knowledge,
and could in no way control." 56
In Estey Co. v. Dick 57 the bailee secretly and against the terms
of the lease placed a piano in an incorporated storage warehouse under
a fictitious name. Several months later the bailor discovered the where-
abouts of the piano and-brought an action of replevin to recover its
possession. The warehouse company refused to return the piano unless
the storage charges were paid, alleging that since it was an incorporated
storage company it was bound to receive without discrimination, like
a common carrier, the goods of all who offer them, and therefore
it acquired a lien for storage charges even as against the demand of
the real owner. In ruling against the warehouse company, the Supe-
rior Court said: "We are led then to inquire to what extent the courts
of this country have adopted the fundamental principle that the right
of private property in the true owner of it is superior to that of any
other, be he purchaser, carrier or warehouseman, whose right has its
origin in and follows from the act of one who is tortiously in the pos-'
session of the property. It would seem to be apparent that if we are
to recognize in such cases the right of the lien here claimed, and give
to it the normal and necessary incidents to make it effective, we come
perilously near reinstating, in effect, the repudiated doctrine of sales
in market overt. The correct principle generally adhered to by the
courts of last resort throughout the states of the Union is thus declared
by Fletcher, J., speaking for the tSupreme Court of Massachusetts, in
Robinson v. Baker, 59 Mass. 137, in an opinion analyzing all the cases,
English and American, our own case of King v. Richards, among
them: 'If the owner loses his property, or is robbed or it, or it is sold
or pledged without his consent by one who has only a . . . qualified
possession of it for a specific purpose, as for . . . work to be done
56. Id. at 88.
57. 41 Pa. Super. 61o (igio).
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upon it, the owner can follow and reclaim it in the possession of any
person howsoever innocent.'" 51
The Pennsylvania courts, while recognizing there may be circum-
stances from which an owner's consent can be reasonably implied,51 haq
never on the grounds of implied authority subordinated the rights of
a bailor under a bailment lease to the common-law lien of a repair-
man. There have been ample opportunities where the courts of Penn-
sylvania might have exercised the doctrine of implied authority or fa-
vored the repairman. In addition to Stern v. Sica and Estey Co. v.
Dick, previously mentioned, there are such cases as Banker's Commer-
cial Security Co. v. Brenndn & Levy. 0 In this case a mechanic made
repairs to a truck at the request of one who was in possession thereof
under a bailment lease. The bailment lease contract required the lessee
to keep the truck in good order and repair and surrender the same at
the expiration of the lease "in as good condition as when received by
the lessee,'ordinary wear and tear excepted." While in the possession
of the lessee, it was damaged by fire, and delivered to the mechanic
for repairs without the knowledge of the owner. The lessee having
defaulted in payment, the owner sought by writ of replevin to repos-
sess truck from the mechanic. The mechanic contended that the repairs
made by him were extraordinary in character and inured to the benefit
of the owner, and that extraordinary repairs which inure to the owner,
and which are not necessitated by any negligence of the lessee, are to
be borne by the owner. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that
the owner could replevy the truck. The court observed that the lessee
"certainly could not have sold the truck so as to pass the owner's title,
and as a general rule there is no reason why a party not the owner
of property should be permitted to create a lien upon it any more than
he should be permitted to sell it." 01
There is, indeed, little logic in saying that a bailor by intrusting
the possession and use of a chattel to another impliedly authorizes the
party to impose a lien thereon for repairs. Instead of presuming that
the bailor has authorized the bailee to contract for repairs, it seems
more consonant with reason to presume that the bailor has given the
possession to the bailee with the understanding that the bailee shall
personally incur all expenses necessary to keep the chattel in the con-
dition it was in at the time possession was acquired. The bailee cus-
tomarily bears the expense of repairs to chattels in his possession, espe-
cially if it is a bailment looking forward to an ultimate sale. The
58. Id. at 615.
59. Estey Co. v. Dick, 41 Pa. Super. 61o (igio).
6o. 75 Pa. Super. 199 (192o).
61. Id. at 203.
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repairs accrue to the benefit of the bailee-the eventual purchaser. The
purpose of a bailment lease is to furnish security to the bailor. Is it
reasonable to assume that a bailor would confer upon a bailee an
authority to create a lien on the chattel paramount to his own? It is
the basis of a contract of this character that nothing should be done,
or permitted, by the bailee to impair the security. An act which will
defeat the purpose of the transaction should not be presumed or in-
ferred.
It has constantly been maintained that the repairman's lien will
impair the bailor's security. This, however, is not always true. The
repairs frequently add to the value of the chattel which is restored to
the bailor, upon default of the bailee, and thereby preserves a security
which might otherwise be valueless. But the bailor, not the bailee,
should decide what repairs are necessary and reasonable. If expensive
and unnecessary repairs are made upon the chattel, the bailor's security
has been impaired if the repairman's claim is given a priority. A rule
that subordinates the rights of the bailor puts into the hands of the
person in possession the power to impair the security of the bailor
without his consent. It is practically impossible for a person, not know-
ing anything about the condition of a chattel prior to repair, to deter-
mine that the repairs were necessary and reasonably priced. Such a
rule would be a prolific source of fraud and spoliation of security.
The common-law lien is generally based on a contract. A funda-
mental principle of our property law is that no man can be divested
of his property without his consent, except by due process of law.
0 2
This principle was the basis of the decision in Estey Co. v. Dick.
An innkeeper at common law was accorded a lien upon all goods
brought into the hotel by the guest, even though the goods had been
stolen from a third person.63 The innkeeper's lien was based upon the
principle that he should be compensated in some way for the liability
as practically an insurer for the guest's goods he was forced to assume
and for the duty to serve all transients who should apply at his inn up
to the limit of accommodations. 64 The courts have continued to apply
these principles in states where the lien of innkeeper has been given by
statute, on the ground that the statutes are generally merely declara-
62. Cooperider v. Myre, 37 Ohio App. 502, 175 N. E. 235 (1930); see Estey Co.
v. Dick, 41 Pa. Super. 6Io, 615 (igio); (1936) IO U. OF CiN. L. REV. 495.
63. Robins & Co. v. Gray, [i8g5] 2 Q. B. Div. 5Ol; Cook v. Kane & Prentice, 13
Ore. 482 (1886) ; BEAL THE LAw OF INNIEEPERS AND HOTELS (1906) § 256, 261,
262; BROWN, PERSONAL PRoPERTY (1936) § I4; (1936) IO U. OF CIN. L. Rrv. 495.
The innkeeper would not be accorded a lien, of course, if he was aware of the guest's
wrongful possession.
64. BEALF, THE LAw OF INNKEEFERS AND HOTELs (19o6) §§ 251-252; DoBIE, BAIL-
MENTS AND CARRIERS (1914) § 100.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tory of the common-law rules. 5 This is the Pennsylvania view.,6  The
innkeeer is, therefore, almost everywhere permitted to assert his lien
against a conditional seller, chattel mortgagee, or bailor0 7
The lien of the inkeeper is considerably broader than the other
common-law liens.68 The lien of a common carrier, for example, does
not extend to goods innocently received for shipment by the carrier
without the consent of the true owner. 9 This is so in spite of the
fact that the common carrier and innkeeper have similar responsibili-
ties; both are obliged to serve all applicants and to assume the liability
of practically an insurer. A common carrier is not accorded a lien on
goods transported at the instance of a conditional buyer, chattel mort-
gagor, or bailee.7 0
If a common carrier is not accorded a lien on goods carried at
the instance of one rightfully in possession, but without authority to
have the goods carried for the owner, then there is little reason why
the -artisan or repairman who acts at the instance of bailee should be
given priority over the bailor. The artisan or repairman is not obli-
gated to render services on all goods tendered and he does not assume
an exceptional liability for loss of the goods. His claim for superiority
is obviously not as meritorious as the demand of the common carrier
for priority.
In general, the priority of legal interests is determined by the
order of their creation."1 - A lien which is prior in time is said to be
prior in right. Accordingly, a repairman's lien should not be given
precedence over a title-retaining instrument previously executed.
Eliminating the purely legalistic reasoning that might support the
claims of priority of one or the other two groups of rival claimants,
65. Horace Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 189 N. Y. 3o2, 82 N. E. 143 (19o7); (1936)
IO U. OF GIN. L. REv. 495.
66. Scorr, LAW or BAILMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA (1931) 153; cf. Young v. Kim-
ball, 23 Pa. 193, 195 (1854).
67. Horace Waters & Co. v. Gerard, i89 N. Y. 302, 82 N. E. 143 (1907);
Mathews v. Victor Hotel Co., 74 Misc. 426, 132 N. Y. Supp. 375 (i911); Whiteside,
Priorities Between Chattel Mortgagee or Conditional Seller and Subsequent Lienors
(1925) 1O CORN. L. Q. 331, 343. Occasionally, but rarely, statutes are found limiting
the lien of the innkeeper to the property of the guest himself. BROWN, PERSONA. PRop-
mERr" (1936) § 114.
68. Whiteside, Priorities Between Chattel Mortgagee or Conditional Seller and
Subsequent Lienors (1925) Io CORN. L. Q. 331.
69. Ibid.; (19o9) 23 HARv. L. REv. 63; (1936) 10 U. OF CIx. L. REV. 495; Savan-
nah, F. & W. Ry. v. Talbot, 123 Ga. 378, 51 S. E. 401 (19o) (goods delivered to car-
rier by wrongdoer) ; Gilson v. Gwinn, 107 Mass. 126 (I89i) (goods delivered to car-
rier by bailee); Swinson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 117 Kan. 258, 23o Pac. 1O46
(1924) (goods delivered to carrier by chattel mortgagor) ; Corinth Engine & Boiler
Works v. Mississippi Central R. R., 95 Miss. 817, 49 So. 261 (igo9) (goods delivered
to carrier by chattel mortgagor) ; Owens v. Burlington, etc. Co., ii S. D. 153 (1898)
(goods delivered to carrier by chattel mortgagor).
7o. See note 69 supra.
71. Jensen v. Wilcox Lumber Co., 295 Ill. 294, x29 N. E. 133 (1920) (mortgagee's
lien prior) ; General Motors-Acceptance Corp. v. Sutherland, i22 Neb. 720, 241 N. W.
281 (1932) (conditional seller's lien prior) ; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 527.
LIENS FOR REPAIRS AND STORAGE CHARGES
let us ask ourselves: Is it more desirable from a commercial viewpoint
that the repairman be given a lien paramount to the encumbrancer who
is prior in point of time, or vice versa? Let us look at the question
solely from the standpoint of the business man.
A priority granted to a repairman will not only be taking the
property of one man without his consent to pay the debts of another,
but may so seriously impair the security of title-retaining instruments
that these forms of doing business will become too precarious for
practical use. Carried to its greatest possible extent, a priority given
to a repairman could be the cause of a total loss to an installment seller
of all that remained due to him under the security agreement. Title-
retaining instruments (conditional sales, chattel mortgages, and bail-
ment leases) should be protected and safeguarded as they have become
indispensable vehicles of credit in our commercial world. Large sums
of money are invested on the security of these instruments. The auto-
mobile industry, the country's largest single industry, is dependent upon
the safety and security of these tools of credit.
A rule favoring the priority of repairmen would put owners of
automobiles at the mercy of unscrupulous garagemen. There are doubt-
less many who distrust automobile mechanics. Repairmen have fre-
quently taken unfair advantage of a bailor's or finance company's ignor-
ance of the condition of the automobile brought to them, and have
made unwarranted repairs at unreasonable prices. The bailor or finance
company is not usually in a position to dispute a repairman's claim.
In a day when a majority of automobiles are purchased under a
title-retaining instrument, garage proprietors cannot assert that repairs
were made on the presumption that the party in possession was the
rightful owner. Garage keepers are thoroughly acquainted with the
extent to which automobiles are bought on the installment plan. Neither
justice nor commercial necessity warrants a special protection to re-
pairmen at the expense of an innocent third person. The repairman
may always recover the costs of the repairs from the person at whose
request they were made. There is apparently no justification for con-
ferring on a repairman privileges not accorded innocent persons to
whom stolen property has been sold or pledged. These are hazards to
which persons in business are continually exposed.
The Pennsylvania courts, in justifying the priority that they have
accorded bailors, point out that the repairman acts voluntarily and
that there is nothing to prevent a repairman from demanding and re-
ceiving in advance the repair charges.72 There is, however, frequently
72. See Stern v. Sica, 66 Pa. Super. 84, 89 (1917) ; Estey Co. v. Dick, 41 Pa.
Super. 61o, 616 (igio).
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present the practical difficulty of figuring in advance the costs of repairs.
An automobile sometimes has to be torn almost apart before a me-
chanic can diagnose the mechanical trouble and determine the costs of
repairs.
A Georgia case,73 in subordinating the lien of a repairman to the
prior rights of a conditional seller, suggested that the remedy of the
repairman was to pay off the conditional seller and then subject the
chattel to a lien as against the buyer. This is in line with what Jones 74
has said in respect to chattel mortgages: "When the chattels have been
taken from the possession of a lienholder and sold under a chattel mort-
gage, the surplus after satisfying such mortgages belongs to the lien-
holder to the amount of his lien." There seems to be no reason why
the same idea cannot be applied to bailment leases. A bailee, as well
as a conditional buyer or chattel mortgagor, should be able to create a
lien affecting his own interest in the property. A lien ordinarily
attaches to the interest, whatever it may be, of the person who re-
quested the labor and materials furnished.
The stand of the Pennsylvania courts against liens for repair and
storage charges is in keeping with the position they have taken in all
instances where rights of third persons have clashed with the interests
of a bailor. The interest of the bailor in a Pennsylvania bailment lease
is to be protected regardless of the hardship that is worked against
innocent persons. This seems to be a policy of the courts. And since
the courts have repeatedly considered the bailment lease with option
to buy identical with an ordinary bailment for use until the option has
been exercised, the position of the courts in this instance is probably
based upon sound legal reasoning.
73. Baughman Auto Co. v. Emanuel, 137 Ga. 354, 73 S. E. 511 (i9ii). Suggestion •
approved in Cache Auto Co. v. Central Garage, 63 Utah io, 221 Pac. 86a (1923).
74. 2 JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES'(6th ed. 1933) § 472.
